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We introduce a general framework for exploring the problem of selecting a committee of representatives
with the aim of studying a networked voting rule based on a decentralized large scale platform, which can
assure a strong accountability of the elected. The results of our simulations suggest that this algorithm-based
approach is able to obtain a high representativeness for relatively small committees, performing even better than
a classical voting rule based on a closed list of candidates. We show that a general relation between committee
size and representatives exists in the form of an inverse square root law and that the normalized committee size
approximately scales with the inverse of the community size, allowing the scalability to very large populations.
These findings are not strongly influenced by the different networks used to describe the individuals interactions,
except for the presence of few individuals with very high connectivity which can have a marginal negative effect
in the committee selection process.
I. INTRODUCTION
The selection of an exemplar group of representatives
to make decisions on behalf of a larger community is a
widespread and critical problem for human societies1,2. Ex-
amples can be found in the election of a legislative assembly
in indirect democracies, in the elections for the trade union,
for supervisory or faculty board, for executive officers or non-
governmental organization boards. The most widely used
electoral systems can be classified into one of the following
groups: first-past-the-post, two-round systems, proportional
representation, ranked voting or in a mix of two or more of the
previous groups3–7. In general, these systems seek to strike
a balance between representativeness and effectiveness. In
the vast majority of electoral systems, including fully propor-
tional representation systems2, representatives gain a power of
representation that is not completely proportional to the num-
ber of voters they represent, but rather the result of a given
granularity. Interestingly, this problem is also relevant for ar-
tificial systems, such as software multiagent systems, i.e. in
recommendation systems8 and election-based mechanisms for
distributing data over an overlay P2P network9.
In this work, we address the general problem of selecting a
group of candidates that best represents the voters. We con-
sider systems where each voter is allowed to vote for only one
candidate and the elected are the ones who obtain a better rank
among their counterparts. In particular, we focus on the case
of multi-winner elections, that is choosing a collective body
of a given size (a committee). We model an idealized situa-
tion where voters are rational individuals, which means that
they make a decision to maximize their representation, and
they present a general knowledge of the candidates and direct
access to them.
In classical elections, a fixed number of candidates partic-
ipates and voters rank the candidates expressing their prefer-
ences. We introduce a new formal model, where the list of
candidates is not fixed in advance, but they emerge as a self-
organized process controlled by the voting rules. Moreover,
voters express not preferences, but opinions, which determine
their indications about who they would like to see as their rep-
resentative.
Our model introduces new mechanisms which give a fun-
damental importance to the accountability of the elected com-
mittee. The connection between representatives and con-
stituents is fundamental and it is the basis for accountability,
allowing to check for incompetence and corruption. In clas-
sical voting systems, this link can be generally insured only
for small size community. In particular, for the national leg-
islative assembly, it can be partially controlled by the small
size of the electoral district. Our model introduces a radical
difference for obtaining an efficacious accountability. In fact,
it takes into account individuals first-hand trust relationship
as a key ingredient to determine the elected representatives.
Votes are assigned on the basis of a self-declared confidence
circle, which is a network of trusted individuals which can be
implemented on an on-line platform.
After having implemented this new voting rule, its effects
are tested modeling the behavior of the selected commit-
tee. The committee runs a series of ballots making choices
about different issues. The quality of the elected committee
is numerically assessed based on how much their final deci-
sions are consistent with the personal opinions of the commu-
nity. Note that many works study scenarios where represen-
tatives make decisions which are compared with some objec-
tive truth1,10. In contrast, as in11, our approach is interested
in discriminating the selected boards which best represent the
community opinions.
II. THE MODEL
The system is composed of a population of Ne electors and
an internet-based platform. The platform allows the voters to
self-declare who belongs to their confidence circle, which is a
network of trusted individuals. The same platform is used by
voters to manifest their opinions onNi issues. Issues are orga-
nized in questions which can be defined by a committee or by
means of a self-organized process internal to the community.
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2The answers of each individual j are organized in a vector vj .
The vector is composed by Ni cells and each cell can assume
the value 1 if the answer is positive, −1 if it is negative or 0 if
the question is left unanswered.
The following step allows to find the better representative
for each confidence circle. First, we consider an individual j
and we compute the vectors overlaps with all his neighbors k.
This is obtained using the expression:
vj ∗ vk =
∑Ni
m=1(v
j
m · vkm)δ(vjm, vkm)∑Ni
m=1(v
j
m · vkm)2
, (1)
where the numerator counts the number of questions answered
in the same way (only yes or not) and the denominator counts
the number of questions answered simultaneously by both in-
dividuals. Each individual j will indicate as his representative
the individual k′ for which vj ∗ vk′ is maximum. In the case
where more than one individual generates the same maximum
overlap value, the individual with a higher connectivity is cho-
sen as the representative. For the exceptional case when also
the connectivity is equal, the representative is randomly se-
lected between the similar ones.
After the selection of the representative k′ for every voter j,
as constrained by his confidence network, the final step con-
sists of choosing the aggregate of representatives of the entire
community. To this end, we construct a directed graph where
a node represents each individual and a directed link connects
the individual with his personal representative. In this graph,
which in general can be composed by different disconnected
clusters, cycles are present. They represent individuals that
have been mutually indicated by themselves. As all the indi-
viduals outside the cycles are represented by the individuals
belonging to them, individuals who belong to cycles are the
proper potential representatives for the community (see figure
1).
As a final step, among the individuals belonging to a cycle,
only the ones with a number of votes larger than a threshold θ
are indicated as representatives. Votes are counted consider-
ing the cumulative flow defined by the directed graph. If the
individual j is pointing to z, z receives all the votes previously
received by j plus one. This flow of votes is computed only
following links outside the cycles. Inside the cycles, only the
single vote of an individual is counted. In this way the number
of representatives is reduced and results to be a fraction of the
total individuals which belong to a cycle.
III. RESULTS
A. General analysis
The individuals’ opinions in relation to the selected issues
are randomly generated with the following rule: given an is-
sue i, an individual does not present an opinion (vi = 0)
with probability 1/3. The probability to have an opinion
vi = +1(−1), is 1/3+i (1/3−i), where i is a random vari-
able following a normal distribution with mean value equal to
zero and σ2 = 0.05. Such a simplified characterization of the
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Figure 1. Schematic representation of the vote process. Nodes stand
for the individuals; the red ones belong to a cycle and will be con-
firmed as representatives if they collect more votes that the estab-
lished threshold. The big numbers associated to the nodes represent
the received cumulated votes. Arrows stand for the indication of
each individual and the small numbers associated to them represent
the number of transferred votes. Dotted arrows belong to a cycle,
where there is no cumulative transfer of votes.
single opinions presents some contact with real political opin-
ions which, frequently, are polarized, presenting a natural bi-
modality of preferences in political and economical issues12.
The confidence circle of each individual is modelled gen-
erating a network where nodes represent individuals and links
the trust relationships present in the community. The con-
fidence circle of an individual is obtained selecting a node
and considering its first neighbors. Note that an important
simplification of this approach is the fact that it generates in-
dividuals with symmetric trust relationships. In the follow-
ing analysis three types of networks are considered. Ho-
mogeneous random networks, implementing the Erdo¨s-Re´nyi
model13, where the degree distribution is peaked around a typ-
ical value 〈k〉, heterogeneous networks, using the Barabasi-
Albert model14, with a power-law degree distribution P (k) ∝
k−3 and networks with the small-world property using the
Watts and Strogatz model15. Our aim is not to model specific
aspects of a real social network, but to use simple examples
just to discuss the possible influence of some relevant network
properties (such as the heterogeneity in the degree distribu-
tion, the average degree and the small-world property), on the
behavior of our model.
The exploration of the system behavior can be obtained
considering two fundamental observables. The first one is
the normalized committee size which is measured as the ratio
between the number of elected individuals (E) and the total
number of individuals of the community: Frep = E/Ne. The
second one is the representativeness. This is defined measur-
ing the fraction of decisions expressed by the elected com-
mittee (ej) which matches with the community decisions (cj)
3over all the considered Ni issues: R =
∑Ni
j=1 δ(ej−cj)
Ni
. As the
opinions expressed by our community is bimodal, it follows
that R ≥ 0.5.
The decision expressed by the elected committee is ob-
tained through a majority vote where each representative’s
vote is weighted by the numbers of popular votes he received
in the election procedure. The community decision is ob-
tained by a direct process (plebiscite), where every individual
votes in accordance with the opinion expressed in his vector
vj . Note that if the individual has no opinion on a particular
issue, he abstains from voting.
In Figure (2) we show the representativenessR and the nor-
malized committee size Frep as a function of the threshold
Θ = θ/Ne for different values of the number of issues Ni, as
obtained in a typical system with confidence circles defined
from an Erdo¨s-Re´nyi network. As expected, the representa-
tiveness and the normalized committee size decrease when in-
creasing the threshold value. In particular, the decrease of the
normalized committee size is very fast.
For fixed threshold values, decreasing the number of issues,
quite intuitively, increases the representativeness. Similarly, it
increases the normalized committee size. This last effect is not
obvious and it is produced by the fact that for a small number
of issues the distribution of votes has a less pronounced peak
and the threshold is not very efficient in selecting between the
indicated individuals. Anyway, this tendency rapidly saturates
and, for Ni > 40, the curves do not show any relevant depen-
dence on this parameter.
The ideal committee corresponds to a small group of repre-
sentatives which expresses a high level of representativeness.
This is obtained selecting an intermediate value for Θ, which
can be identified seeking for a representativeness close to 0.9,
and looking at the corresponding committee size. For this rea-
son, in the following we will plot the representativeness vs.
the normalized committee size, which allows a clear visual-
ization of this fundamental relationship. In Figure 3 we can
observe that for fixed values of R, the normalized committee
size increases when the number of issues increases.
The relation between R and Frep, as reported in Figure 3,
can be characterized by a simple relation: 1−R ∝ 1/√Frep.
of the obtained representativeness in relation to the ideal one
scales as the square of the inverse of the normalized commit-
tee size. This means that, for example, for improvingR−1 by
a factor of 2, the number of elected must quadruplicates. This
relation can be justified considering that 1−R is proportional
to the error in the estimation of the mean opinion vi (the re-
sult of the plebiscite) using a sample of size Frep. In the case
where the estimation of the mean opinion uses an independent
and identically distributed sample of size n, it is well known
that the standard error of the sample mean scales as n−1/2. In-
terestingly, the same scaling law is preserved using our voting
rule, which effectively can be seen as a particular data sample
strategy.
A similar analysis was conduced looking at the dependence
on the system size Ne (see Figure 4). Surprisingly, fixing R,
the committee size decreases with the system size. For exam-
ple, for the parameters used in Figure 4, a representativity of
0.9 is obtained with a committee of 29 members for a commu-
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Figure 2. Representativeness (left) and the normalized committee
size (right, semi-logarithmic plot) as a function of the threshold Θ for
different values of the number of issues Ni. Both panels correspond
to Ne = 10000 and confidence circles defined from a Erdo¨s-Re´nyi
network with 〈k〉 = 40. Results are averaged over 100 different
realizations.
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Figure 3. Left: Representativity vs normalized committee size
Right: logarithmic plot of 1 − R vs normalized committee size for
Ni = 40. The continuous line has slope −1/2. For both figures
Ne = 10000 and confidence circles are defined from a Erdo¨s-Re´nyi
network with 〈k〉 = 40. Results are averaged over 100 different
realizations.
nity of 1000 individuals, and with just 15 representatives for
Ne = 30000. In particular, fixing R = 0.9, Frep decreases
approximately with the inverse of Ne using a Barabasi-Albert
network, and even faster for an Erdo¨s-Re´nyi network.
In Fig. 5 we can see that the representativeness is not
strongly dependent on the connectivity of the network, and
for 〈k〉 > 40 the curves present very similar behaviors. The
heterogeneity in the degree distribution of the network seems
to have a relative small impact on the results too, as it can be
appreciated by comparing the results of the Erdo¨s-Re´nyi net-
work with the Barabasi-Albert one. Finally, the small world
property of the Watts-Strogatz model does not influence our
results.
These results are consistent with the inspection of the re-
lation between the individuals connectivity and the number
of votes they received. As can be appreciated in Figure (6),
even if it is necessary a reasonable connectivity (higher than
the mean value) to obtain votes and a higher connectivity in-
creases the probability to obtain more votes, for Erdo¨s-Re´nyi
networks this effect is weak and not impactful. For the case of
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Figure 4. Left: representativity vs normalized committee size for
a Erdo¨s-Re´nyi network. Right: logarithmic plot of the normalized
committee size fixing R = 0.9, as a function of the number of
electors. Data are well approximated by a power-law fitting (con-
tinuous lines). For the Barabasi-Albert network (blue) the power-
law exponent is −1.06 ± 0.05, for the Erdo¨s-Re´nyi network (red)
−1.18± 0.03. The parameters used in the simulations are 〈k〉 = 40
and Ni = 40 . Results are averaged over 100 different realizations.
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Figure 5. Representativity vs the fraction of elected citizens. On the
left we consider a Erdo¨s-Re´nyi network with different connectivities,
Ne = 10000 and Ni = 40. On the right we display the semi-
logarithmic plot of three different networks: Erdo¨s-Re´nyi, Barabasi-
Albert and Watts-Strogatz, with Ne = 10000, Ni = 40, 〈k〉 = 40.
The Watts-Strogatz network has β = 0.1. Results are averaged over
100 different realizations.
the Barabasi-Albert network, this effect is more relevant and
probably it is the responsible for the influence that this topol-
ogy has on the behavior of the representativity and normalized
committee size (Fig. 5), determining a slightly weaker perfor-
mance. In fact, it moderately decreases the representativeness
for a fixed committee size, as higher connectivity generates a
bias in the selection of the more representative individuals.
B. Comparison with other voting rules
In the following we explore if our model, at least theo-
retically, selects committees who present a representativeness
comparable with other traditional methods of body selection.
Obviously representativeness is compared among committees
of the same size.
A first possible comparison is with a model of a traditional
majority voting for the selection of representatives in a closed
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Figure 6. Left: mean connectivity 〈kV 〉 of a individual which re-
ceived a number of votes V . Right: mean number of votes 〈Vk〉
collected by individuals with a given connectivity k. Data are ob-
tained using 1000 different realizations in a Erdo¨s-Re´nyi network
(top) and a Barabasi-Albert one (bottom), with 〈k〉 = 40, Ni = 40
and Ne = 10000.
list of previously selected candidates. This is probably the
most common practice in selecting committees. An example
can be found in the election of legislative assembly with the
system of multi-member districts. In our simulations, a list
of m candidates is randomly selected among the community
and each individual votes for the candidate who presents the
higher overlap with its opinion vector. Decisions are taken
with the same weighted voting rule. This modeling approach
mimics a voter who presents a perfect knowledge of the
candidates, and it assumes that he makes a rational decision
to maximize his representation. Also for this voting rule,
representativeness is computed by comparing the decisions
taken by the committee, obtained with a weighted majority
voting process, with the results of the direct popular vote.
As can be appreciated in Figure 7, our model is by far more
efficient, reducing the size of the committees in more than
a half. Notice that if the voting process is not weighted, the
difference is even bigger.
Finally, we compare our method to an idealized perfect
voting rule. This rule represents a situation of rational
individuals that have a perfect knowledge of all the other
individuals, which means that they perfectly know the opin-
ion of all the other individuals. Moreover they are globally
networked, which means that they have a direct access to
all other individuals, allowing to check their acts. In this
situation, a voter indicates an individual which presents the
higher overlap with his opinion vector. The selected com-
5mittee is composed by the first Frep · Ne individuals which
poll more. Also in this case, the committee decisions are
taken by means of a weighted majority vote. This voting rule,
although unrealistic, is still useful, at least, in two respects.
Firstly, very small communities can exhibit similar character-
istics. Secondly, the model is a useful yardstick for evaluating
the levels of representativeness of other more realistic models.
Note that this voting rules can be considered, from a more
abstract point of view, as an optimization problem: to find the
vectors with greater overlap in an ensemble of given vectors,
with no other constraints. In contrast, our original voting rule
corresponds to the same optimization problem constrained by
the fact that the overlap is inspected only locally, on a small
subset of the ensemble of given vectors, because of the pres-
ence of the confidence circles.
In Figure 7 we compare the representativeness of the per-
fect voting rule with our networked rule for different com-
mittee sizes. It is quite impressive that the representativeness
of our voting rule is comparable with the perfect voting rule.
Actually, the voting rule here presented performs even slightly
better than the perfect rule, probably due to the effects of the
cumulated voting in the weights used for selecting the com-
mittee decisions. This fact suggests that the constraints in-
troduced by the confidence circles in the optimization of the
opinions overlap are not effective in limiting the process of
selecting the best overlaps because of the positive effects gen-
erated by the specific voting rule.
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Figure 7. Representativity vs the fraction of representatives for our
model (blue curve), a model where a closed list of randomly se-
lected politicians collect votes maximizing the overlap with the elec-
torate (green curve) and a perfect voting rule (red curve). Parameters:
Ne = 10000, Ni = 40 and 〈k〉 = 40.
IV. DISCUSSION
We introduced a general framework for studying the prob-
lem of selecting a committee of representatives to make deci-
sions on behalf of a larger community. In our approach, we do
not probabilistically study some properties of a particular vot-
ing rule, but we realistically implement it taking into account
the effects of the individuals’ opinions and of their social rela-
tions. Moreover, we model the behavior of the selected com-
mittee which is called to make choices about different issues.
In this way, we are able, not simply to compare their choices
with some abstract truth, but to clearly quantify the relation
between representativeness and committee size.
Based on this scheme, it is possible to study the properties
of a new networked voting rule, introduced with the aim of ob-
taining high representativeness together with strong account-
ability of the elected. This rule also presents the interesting
feature that the candidates are not fixed in advance, but they
emerge as a self-organized process.
The results of our simulations suggest that this rule
is able to obtain a high representativeness for relatively
small committees. In fact, these outputs are comparable
with an ideal perfect voting rule, and they perform clearly
better than a classical voting rule based on a closed list
of candidates. Moreover, for fixed representativeness, the
normalized committee size approximately scales with the
inverse of the community size, allowing the scalability of this
approach to very large populations. Finally, we were able to
characterize the relation between the committee size and the
representatives by means of a general inverse square root law.
These findings are robust and they are not strongly
influenced by general properties of the network used to
describe the individuals interactions. It seems that only the
heterogeneity can have some role in modifying the relation
between representativeness and committee size. In fact, the
presence of a few individuals with very high connectivity can
negatively influence the selection process of the committee.
This fact is consistent with the risks related to a dominant
position of single individuals, which may lead to a general
sub-representation of the general opinion of the community.
The introduction of this networked voting rule, based on a
decentralized large scale platform, can be considered as an in-
teresting tool for implementing an hyper-representative mech-
anism of committee selection based on a distributed social
mechanism where the use of a block chain encryption mecha-
nism could guarantee the security of the voting process. This
algorithm-based approach facilitates the participation of the
entire population both as electors and as representatives, dis-
missing the importance of traditional authorities. Our analy-
sis highlights the feasibility and potential of this election rule
from the point of view of an organizational theory; specific
and thorny political theory considerations and risks are not
addressed.
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